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Flexibility and innovation in response to emerging infectious diseases: 
Reactions to multi-drug resistant Tuberculosis in India 
 
 
Emerging infectious diseases regained substantial international attention in recent years and it 
has been argued that flexibility and innovation in public health systems is needed in order to 
react to changing challenges. This paper will take these policy claims as a starting point to 
examine the case of multi-drug resistant Tuberculosis (MDR-TB) in India. 
Based on fieldwork results it will be examined how the existing control efforts of TB in India 
respond to the emergence of MDR-TB, what solutions are discussed for diagnosing, treating and 
preventing MDR-TB and what can be learned from that with regard to innovation and flexibility 
of a public health system in a country like India. The discussions and reactions to MDR-TB 
indicate that arguments for flexibility meet constraints of the existing control system and the 
Indian public health and wider social system. However, the flexibility that is argued for goes 
beyond what has been envisaged in international policy arenas (mainly focusing on preparation 
of various capacities in surveillance, detection and research). Rather it involves localized 
learning and experimenting within existing control structures that are claimed to have become 
too rigid in trying to keep up quality standards faced with a weakening public health system. 
Furthermore, the case shows that existing challenges in TB control resurface with the emergence 
of MDR-TB and reflect a difficult balancing act between biomedical values, socio-cultural values 
and operational feasibility.  
However, various actors are striving for change and it is in these instances that one can start to 
understand what flexibility and innovation could mean for a public health challenge such as TB 
in India. The paper concludes with an argument for a detailed analysis of these changes from an 
innovation perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Emerging infectious diseases1 have regained a great deal of international attention in recent years, 
not least with the outbreak of SARS and bird flu (Glass, 2004, Fidler, 2004). Public health 
specialists agree that dealing with new and re-emerging infectious diseases requires a 
multipronged approach (WHO, 2003b, Alan, 2003). For an adequate public health and policy 
response it is therefore important to stay flexible and foster diverse forms of innovation processes 
in order to be able to react to uncertainties created by continuously changing challenges (EASAC, 
2006). These uncertainties are increasing with regard to possible future outbreaks, sudden 
mutations of viruses, possible drug resistance, poor health infrastructure, failing vaccine 
strategies and additional unknown challenges of international trade and travel, global warming 
and ageing societies (Eurosurveillance, 2005).  
The flexibility in reaction that is needed is concerned with preparation of response and innovative 
capacity in a variety of areas such as rapid identification and surveillance, public health 
infrastructure, vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics, training and manpower in clinical sciences 
and coordination of science agendas (Eurosurveillance, 2005). Besides large investment in 
different forms of R&D2 (EASAC, 2006), the challenge is to develop new public health solutions 
that are affordable, acceptable and applicable to local setting (WHO, 2003). Forecasting 
techniques, computer-modelling or disease epidemiology can help to measure potential impact 
and set priorities (Pompe, 2005). Flexibility is thus understood as the ability of a control system 
to detect and respond to new challenges quickly by being able to make use of a diverse set of 
potentially beneficial disciplines, actors and capabilities at various levels. As Owen and Roberts 
(2005) put it:  
“SARS served to clearly demonstrate the key requirements of robust health 
policies that are required to enable a state to be 'resilient' to health challenges. These 
are: ability to assess potential health challenges; prevention as part of the policy mind-
set; preparation; capacity to respond; and ability to rapidly recover. To succeed also 
requires the involvement and consent of empowered civil society. The problem is global 
                                                 
1
 The WHO (2005) defines emerging infectious diseases as "... diseases of infectious origin whose incidence in 
humans has increased within the recent past or threatens to increase in the near future." This definition includes 
newly emerging, re-emerging and infectious diseases that appear in new geographic areas, in new forms or increase 
abruptly. 
2
 In addition to R&D in basic microbiology, immunology and molecular biology to understand pathogens, their host 
interaction and to develop improved antimicrobial drugs, diagnostics and vaccines (EASAC; 2006) it is important 
not to forget research in delivering the medicine, operational research about people’s behaviour or cost-effectiveness 
of various delivery methods. Research by economists, psychologists, sociologists, health services and health delivery 
researchers is important (Embo, 2003) 
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and international but much of the solution must be local and social.” (Owen & Roberts, 
2005) 
 
With these policy claims in mind this paper will focus on the emergence of multi-drug resistant 
Tuberculosis (MDR-TB) in India. It will examine how the Indian TB control system is reacting to 
MDR-TB, what solutions are discussed for diagnosing, treating and preventing MDR-TB and 
what we can learn from that with regard to innovation and flexibility of a public health system in 
a country like India. By examining ongoing discussions and debates around MDR-TB the paper 
will simultaneously provide insights into the general practices and struggles of Tuberculosis 
control in India and the challenges in reacting to changing circumstances. 
 
Tuberculosis (TB) is an infectious disease which can be transmitted through air and requires a 
very long and complicated treatment. Although there have been effective drugs available for 50 
years there have not been enough serious efforts to control the disease. Today, TB remains the 
first among the world’s infectious killers, with more people dying from it than ever before. The 
TB crisis is worsening worldwide with increasing multi-drug resistant forms, so much so that 
experts are speaking of a timebomb that is about to explode and for which we are not prepared 
(Reichman & Hopkins, 2002).  The dynamics of TB in terms of spread and treatment (it is highly 
infectious but transmission is slower and it has characteristics of a chronic disease in treatment 
efforts) are different than the dynamics of fast-spreading infectious diseases like SARS or avian 
flu. International policy claims may thus fit less to the potential threat of MDR-TB. However, as 
this paper shows, the emergence of MDR-TB is asking for reactions of high speed and quality 
similar to the ones stated at the outset; but the response has to meet and fit within an existing 
control structure. It is thus interesting to examine how the problem is defined and what reactions 
are discussed. 
In recent years there has been increasing international attention to the threat of multi-drug 
resistant (MDR-TB) and extreme multi-drug resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB) fuelled by the 
outbreak of XDR-TB in South Africa which was widely published (Neel, Gandhi, et al., 2006) 
Public health experts fear that in a country like India, with the highest existing burden of TB in 
the world, the potential effect of MDR-TB on ongoing control efforts might be devastating, 
eliminating the successes achieved so far (Interview with public health consultant, international 
PPP, Pune, 29.1.2008). 
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Given the above stated need for flexibility in reaction to emerging public health challenges such 
as MDR-TB one would expect the Indian TB control system to be receptive and open to whatever 
changes and new opportunities might appear and to foster what might be called innovation for 
TB3.  
However, if one takes a closer look at the field level realities the picture that emerges is far more 
complicated with challenges and constraints inherent to the system that hamper learning, 
experimenting and thus flexibility in the response. This paper shows these challenges.  
The paper is based on evidence that has been collected during exploratory fieldwork in India in 
2008 consisting of 45 semi-structured interviews (with public health experts, policymakers, 
scientists, scholars, physicians, medical staff, private practitioners, consultants and members of 
the civil society and international donor community), visits to research institutes, patient homes 
and treatment sites. The following is a first analysis of the data with the aim to identify areas for 
further theoretical and empirical research. 
In the next section, a brief overview on TB control efforts in India will be provided in order to 
better understand the current developments in reaction to MDR-TB which will be examined in 
chapter 3. The last section concludes with reflections along innovation and flexibility in the TB 
control system in India. 
 
 
2. Tuberculosis control in India 
 
India is the country with the highest TB burden in the world. Every three seconds two Indians die 
of the in principle curable disease. It has been estimated that there are 1.8Mio. cases occurring 
annually (Central TB Division, India, 2007). The huge death toll and the long-term impact on 
patients lead to severe economic burden and human suffering. The links between poverty and TB 
are long established (Benatar, 2003; Farmer, 1997). Potentially increasing numbers of co-
infection with HIV and the increasing emergence of strains that are resistant to anti-TB drugs 
might worsen the situation (Central TB Division, India, 2007).  
                                                 
3
 This paper will entail quite a broad understanding of innovation for infectious diseases based on a definition of 
innovation in healthcare by Cunningham (2005). Innovation is defined as change in service products & processes, 
delivery, organizations, system interaction or concepts if it is characterized by introduction of new knowledge. 
However, it will become clear in the pursuit of this paper that it needs further research in order to better understand 
what exactly the particularities of an Indian culture of innovation for infectious diseases such as TB are. 
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The Revised National Tuberculosis Program (RNTCP) is the current TB control program of the 
Indian government and has at its core the DOTS strategy of the WHO4. Depending on the results 
of the diagnosis by sputum samples patients are distributed across four different categories5 and 
put on a strongly standardized treatment with several antibiotics which lasts six to eight months. 
The drugs for the complete treatment are put in a box which is deposited at a DOTS provider in 
the patient’s vicinity (a local shop, pharmacy, post office or even a neighbour can be a designated 
DOTS provider). The patient has to swallow the drugs every alternate day under supervision of 
the DOTS provider. The government is in charge of the whole program from diagnosis centres to 
the delivery of drugs free of charge. 
Opinions about the success or failure of the DOTS program in India differ. Overall the RNTCP is 
judged by many as a success story particularly because of its internationally unprecedented rapid 
expansion in recent years across the country. The RNTCP claims that it has achieved nearly full 
coverage across India (Central TB Division, 2007) but critical voices ask about the quality of that 
coverage since there is still a large number of patients who fail the treatment or who lack access 
to it (Interview with medical anthropologist, 29.1.2008; Chakraborty, 2003; Udwadia & Pinto, 
2007 )6.   
Confronted with this critique the government tends to argue that the biggest challenge in TB 
control is ensuring compliance of the patient to the TB treatment (Interview with medical officer, 
                                                 
4
 The DOTS strategy is consisting of five elements: government commitment, case detection by sputum microscopy, 
standardised treatment regimens of 6-8 months with direct observation (DOT) for at least the initial two months, 
regular supply of anti-TB drugs, and a standardised recording and reporting system (WHO, 
http://www.who.int/tb/dots/en/ accessed on 20.7.2008). 
5
 Sputum smear microscopy is the technique which is used to diagnose TB in DOTS. It consists of the examination 
of sputum (matter thrown up from the lungs) for the detection of a certain type of bacteria. It is the simplest 
laboratory test. It is cheap and is performed within minutes. Depending on the results of three sputum samples the 
patient is put onto one of the three categories and subsequently on the standard DOTS treatment which takes 6 
months  
 - Category I: new smear positive patients, seriously ill patients, co-infected HIV patients 
- Category II: retreatment (defaulted and come back, failure and again started on treatment, relapsed cases 
(long ago, declared as cured, but again infected)) 
 - Category III: new smear negative cases, not seriously ill, extra pulmonary TB 
 - Category IV: MDR, DOTS plus (not yet implemented) 
 
6
 The problems with access and adherence to TB treatment are multifaceted and complex and are dependent on a 
range of factors from patient characteristics to the social and economic environment. Problems of access to care are 
illustrated in the delay between onset of symptoms, diagnosis and treatment. Influential factors have been found to be 
individuals’ perception of the disease, severity of the disease, different access to health services, age, gender, social 
deprivation, economic burden, attitude and expertise of health personnel (Lienhardt et al., 2003). Regarding 
problems of adherence to treatment, Paul Farmer has suggested that social-structural factors such as poverty, 
economic inequity, racism, gender, inequalities, drug use, homelessness, overt political violence or civil disturbance 
are largely to blame. As evidence from operational research studies in Delhi shows, patients who are socially and 
economically marginalized will be least able to adhere to treatment (Singh et al., 2002). 
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RNTCP, Government of Andhra Pradesh, 21.1.2008). Many actors outside the program we 
interviewed criticize the RNTCP for a perspective of pushing patients to take the treatment by 
ignoring more social and cultural factors that could hinder a patient adhering to a treatment that 
comes practically to her/his doorstep (such as nutrition, transport, food security, other support 
mechanisms, gender or stigma). They argue that RNTCP is purely based on the biomedical 
approach, on the battle against the germ, and that the human angle is missing (Interviews: health 
activist, Bangalore, 26.3.2008; medical anthropologist, Mumbai, 31.1.2008; professor in public 
health, Mumbai, 4.2.2008). However, advocates of the RNTCP argue that the program is trying 
to enhance compliance and access to treatment by increasing communication and education 
activities and by training DOTS providers (Interview with supervising medical officer, RNTCP, 
Government AP, Hyderabad, 21.1.2008), that the RNTCP corresponds to the status of the Indian 
public health system in place (Interview with former senior consultant, World Bank, Delhi, 
05.03.2008) and that taking into account or even trying to change social-structural factors is not 
operationally feasible and would exceed available resources and capabilities (Interview with TB 
consultant, WHO India office, Delhi, 22.2.2008). 
The TB control efforts are based on a strong structure or protocol inherent in the treatment 
regime itself: The RNTCP is very system-methodic in its treatment approach which is according 
to some actors important to keep up certain levels of quality across the country and cope with the 
weak health system (Interview with head of national NGO, Hyderabad, 16.2.2008). There are 
clear categories to which patients are assigned after the first diagnosis which helps to provide 
well-defined treatment regimes in settings with low skilled health personnel. Among private 
physicians particularly category II, the retreatment stage, is subject to discussion (which will be 
examined in chapter 3.2.1). As per the guidelines a patient is cured when the sputum turns from 
positive to negative in the last month of treatment and on at least one previous occasion (WHO, 
2002). Members of the private medical sector argue that the RNTCP does not take into account 
the difference between cure and care. They complain that there is no room for care, for patient –
practitioner interaction, flexibility in treatment, possibility to adapt to individual conditions or 
side effects, etc. The focus of the program is entirely on cure as defined by the guidelines and 
completion of treatment according to a protocol. Care is reduced to cure by a box full of drugs.  
These debates show the tensions and an apparent trade-off between individual, flexible treatment 
and the need for classification, standardization, simplification and thus inflexibility within a 
public health program that is trying to cater to the whole population in a uniform way.  
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These tensions touch upon a classic public health dilemma between biomedical values and socio-
political values reflected in program design. Biomedical values characterize programs in 
standardized manner, assume that they are transferable between different contexts and evaluate 
programs in terms of cure and treatment rates. Socio-political values tend to see TB as a disease 
of poverty and demand from programs being flexible, accessible to patients’ needs and living 
conditions, dealing with the side effects of treatment regimes and other structural and social 
factors such as gender or stigma (Porter & Ogden, 1996). DOTS has been criticized 
internationally for its focus on cases and controlling the spread of disease instead of concern for 
individual patient; for a lack of attention to the patient’s cost, unfair treatment of sputum-negative 
patients and potentially unethical treatment of patients by making him/her adhere to treatment at 
all cost (Walt, 1999). In her study on the politics of TB control Walt (1999) argues that an 
orientation towards rigidity, rapidity and results reflects some of the worst characteristics of 
vertical program implementation in infectious disease control. Among others, the demands of 
donors and the international community and the need for results and success stories often lead to 
programs that are too rigid to take into account local conditions and culture, that focus on rapidity 
without allowing health worker and communities to mobilize and thus demand health solutions 
that are too much target-driven, leading to falsification and undermining of results.  
 
Several public health scholars we interviewed argued that the response to TB is always a 
reflection of the current status of the health system and wider social systems (Interviews: 
professor in public health, Delhi, 25.2.2008; medical anthropologist, Mumbai, 31.1.2008; health 
activist, Bangalore, 26.3.2008) and thus it is important to take these contexts into account. TB 
control in India has a long history both in terms of control efforts and indigenous policy 
development which often reflected socio-political conditions of that time (Bannerjee, 1993; 
Narayanan et al, 2003). There was a lot of political attention to TB in 1960s, when some of the 
important TB institutes were set up. Pioneering studies were conducted in Indian research 
institutes, showing the effectiveness of domiciliary treatment7 and the need for direct observation 
of treatment which revolutionized TB control worldwide and provided the basis for today’s 
worldwide TB control strategy by the WHO as early as 1958 (Narayanan et al., 2003). But 
                                                 
7
 The demonstration in the 1960s that ambulatory treatment of tuberculosis was as effective for patients and their 
families as bed rest and treatment in a sanatorium meant the end of the sanatorium era and the beginning of 
domiciliary treatment in TB control. Thus, TB treatment could be made widely available to many patients in 
countries with high prevalence. 
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subsequently the focus shifted to other issues more geared towards population control (Interview 
with director research centre, Hyderabad, 10.3.2008) generally neglecting maintenance of TB 
control infrastructure. The strong focus on population control and family planning during the 
1980s and 90s led to a slow deterioration of general public health services by focusing attention, 
distorting resources and skills away from general public health services. Some of the most often 
cited challenges the public health system is facing today are poor surveillance and monitoring 
and therefore absence of reliable data, poor governance, corruption, lack of human resources and 
of stewardship, all of them strongly affecting TB control efforts. 
The guidelines for TB control are formulated at the political centre in Delhi and there is little 
capacity or room to adapt them to local conditions8. The influence of international actors such as 
the WHO and World Bank on policy design9 is according to many members of the civil society 
too strong and based too much on a particular technical perspective leading to problems in policy 
design (Interviews: head national NGO, Hyderabad, 16.2.2008, health activist, Bangalore, 
26.3.2008; Bannerji, 1993). They argue that these actors can be important in putting certain 
topics on the agenda but that there is a need for changing power balances and opening up space 
for discussions and different opinions. 
 
Thus, the challenges that TB control in India is facing originate from within the TB program, the 
public health system and the wider social system. As will become clear throughout the paper, 
positions of actors in the debate are not always clear-cut. While most of our interviewees agree 
that guidelines are needed, they differ in their opinions on how appropriate these guidelines are 
for local contexts and current status of the health system and how much flexibility they should 
allow for. 
                                                 
8
 Health is a state subject in India. However, as noted above the guidelines for most of the public health programs 
and for infectious diseases in particular are designed and formulated at the central level in Delhi. Sometimes the 
decisions made in Delhi are not very applicable to the local context. There is little room for local policymakers to 
adjust to local contexts and at the state level capacities are mostly missing to make use of that flexibility (Ramani & 
Mavalankar, 2005; Interview director public health research centre, Hyderabad, 16.1.2008). “The more guidelines 
the central government issues, the more straightjacket we become!”(Interivew director public health research centre, 
Hyderabad, 16.1.2008). The staff still needs clear guidelines and prefers working with targets, but it is observed that 
governance capacities are in general slowly increasing also at the state level (Interviews: former senior consultant, 
World Bank, Delhi, 05.03.2008; director public health research centre, Hyderabad, 16.1.2008).   
9
 Among the international players especially the WHO as technical advisor and the World Bank influence health 
policymaking in Delhi with regard to infectious diseases. The WHO influences more on the technical side with daily 
interaction between its WHO consultants and the Central TB Division. The influence of the Bank is more 
conceptually, in formulating policy on the operational side of the problem. 
 12 
 
The few suggestions that have been put forward in order to make the RNTCP more responsible to 
local contexts and needs as a result of operational research, mostly carried out by medical 
anthropologists, are difficult to include in the program; Partly due to politics, but also because 
they often involve huge commitment and resources from the program, the medical staff and their 
skills (Interview with medical anthropologist, Hyderabad, 16.1.2008) which might not be 
operationally feasible. Often a balance has to be found between different solutions. There is a 
constant struggle between the social and the technical, between scientific knowledge, techno-
managerial feasibility of the program and socio-cultural or structural factors. The struggle for this 
balance also characterizes the reactions to MDR-TB as we will see in the next section. 
 
3. Reactions to the emergence of MDR-TB 
 
Multi-drug resistant Tuberculosis (MDR-TB) is defined as resistance to at least Rifampicin and 
Isoniazid, two of the most important standard anti-TB drugs. It develops due to infection with a 
resistant strain or due to poor treatment with inadequate drugs, insufficient drugs, selective, 
unstructured drug intake, poor drug quality or irregular drug supply (Central TB Division, India, 
2007). Although MDR-TB has been an issue for as long as anti-TB drugs have been in use there 
is concern about an increase in drug resistance and the potential impact it could have on existing 
control efforts. Since 2005 MDR-TB is officially on the agenda of the Central TB Division and 
the government is slowly reacting to it- also in response to the pressure of international actors 
such as the WHO. The emergence of MDR-TB is a politically sensitive issue since it should not 
increase when a DOTS strategy is working successfully and thus debates revolve around how 
serious the problem is (China Tuberculosis Control Collaboration, 1996; Interview with director 
research centre, Hyderabad 10.3.2008). Public health experts outside of the government criticize 
that the reactions are not fast enough (Interviews: chest physician, Delhi, 21.2.2008; public health 
consultant, international NGO; Hyderabad, 24.3.2008). But, according to a WHO TB officer, the 
first priority for the central TB division is still implementing the standard TB treatment, DOTS, 
given that full implementation was only reached in 2006 (Interview Delhi, 22.2.2008). 
This section will review, on the basis of qualitative interviews with key informants, some of the 
ongoing discussions about reactions to MDR-TB in India. In accordance with the policy claims 
mentioned at the outset, that changing public health challenges enhance uncertainty and thus need 
flexibility in response, it will examine what actors perceive to be uncertain, how these 
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uncertainties are handled10 and what is debated with regard to the definition of the burden, 
diagnostic techniques, treatment and prevention for MDR-TB. 
 
3.1 Uncertainties in reacting to MDR-TB 
The biggest uncertainties in TB control in India are, according to a WHO TB consultant, the 
definition of the burden of the disease and the delivery of care. The weak data situation implies 
that the baseline of the estimates is contested and estimates are very uncertain. Since the whole 
focus of the RNTCP is based on measurement of detection and cure rates, it means that the 
program indicators are based on uncertainty (Delhi, 22.2.2008).  
The delivery of care and thus outreach of the control efforts is uncertain because of vast 
differences in program performance between states (of which some are enormous in size) and the 
huge unregulated and diversified private sector which is difficult to include and where it is 
literally impossible to calculate incidence or prevalence rate (Interview with TB consultant, 
WHO India office, Delhi, 22.2.2008). Weak monitoring of activities (is DOTS really happening 
at the doorstep?) and potentially lacking moral commitment among medical staff are factors 
further increasing this uncertainty with regard to sustainability of the program (Interview with 
senior researcher, Tuberculosis Research Center (TRC), Chennai 13.3.2008). According to a 
medical anthropologist uncertainty of implementation is further enhanced because the skills 
required of the medical staff for management of these programs are mostly lacking. This is even 
more so today where public-private partnerships are increasing and one needs a certain set of 
skills to manage such partnerships and be able to deal with people outside the public health 
system (Interview Mumbai, 31.1.2008). 
 
With regard to MDR-TB there is additional uncertainty and debate about the prevalence and 
potential impact of MDR-TB on TB control (Central TB Division India, 2007; Interviews: chest 
physician, Delhi, 21.2.2008; public health consultant, national NGO, Hyderabad, 16.2.2008). 
Some years ago the private Hinduja Hospital in Mumbai published data on their TB patients of 
which 32% had MDR-TB and 8% were XDR-TB cases (Udwadia, 2001; Udwadia, Hakinyan & 
Rodriguez, 1996) which created quite some debate among public health experts in India. Clearly, 
the data from these private, tertiary care centres has a strong bias since they are well-known 
referral centres for failure cases. Currently available data from government sources shows 1-3% 
                                                 
10
 Thus referring to what has been termed ‘uncertainty information’ by Van Asselt and Vos (2006). 
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MDR among new sputum positive cases and 13-17% MDR among retreated cases11 (Central TB 
Division, India, 2007). According to a WHO officer the government feels quite well informed 
about the extent of MDR-TB since the Drug Resistance Surveillance survey and former studies 
are revealing similar trends of incidence rates (Central TB Division India, 2008).  
However, even if the incidence rates are more or less certain there is no data baseline available 
and it is thus difficult to define whether MDR-TB is increasing. Opinions differ about the extent 
to which MDR-TB is posing a threat to national TB control and whether it has to be called an 
emerging infectious disease (Interviews: microbiologist, private hospital, Mumbai 9.2.2008; chest 
physician, Delhi, 21.2.2008; TB consultant, WHO India office, Delhi, 22.2.2008, public health 
consultant, national NGO, Hyderabad, 16.2.2008). According to members of civil society 
organizations, MDR-TB is clearly handled as a threat to the RNTCP; and WHO and other 
international players are exerting a lot of pressure on the government to react. There seems to be 
fear that MDR-TB may potentially sabotage the whole program (Interviews: head international 
NGO India office, Hyderabad, 10.3.2008; medical anthropologist, Mumbai, 31.1.2008; director 
NGO research centre, Hyderabad, 10.3.2008). More moderate voices are warning of the creation 
of too much panic among private physicians leading potentially to an overuse of second line 
drugs and argue that it is rather a big social problem that needs to be addressed than an epidemic 
(Interview with microbiologist, private hospital, Mumbai, 9.2.2008).  
 “I learnt not to say it has been increasing, there is no denominator! How can we say it? 
We have a huge bias towards resistance … they come to us when they are not doing well. 
Telling you numbers of our MDR is meaningless.” (Interview with microbiologist, private 
hospital, Mumbai, 9.2.2008) 
 
“I cannot say definitely, it does seem to be slightly on the rise, but definitely it is not 
coming down. .. I think it is one of the emerging infectious diseases for which we need to 
have, if nothing …for it to prevent it, because it’s a disease which is infectious, … 
treatment, cure will become more difficult, and numbers will increase, …” (Interview with 
chest physician, teaching hospital, Delhi 21.2.2008) 
 
Still, if we assume that the government figures are more or less correct we are dealing with a 
huge amount of MDR-TB patients in absolute numbers who can potentially transmit the resistant 
strains. According to a senior microbiologist at the Tuberculosis Research Centre in Chennai it 
might not be the right approach to quantify the problem given the weak data basis (suspect to 
underreporting and not very generalizable data which is from different spots across the country). 
                                                 
11
 Patients who failed the first treatment and started retreatment (Cat II) 
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Rather there is a need to react to MDR-TB within RNTCP and include policy strategies for 
dealing with it (Interview microbiologist, Tuberculosis Research Center (TRC), Chennai 
14.3.2008).  
Thus, uncertainty in TB control in India is not only characterized by how the disease will evolve 
in the future and the potential impact of MDR-TB, there is as much uncertainty about the present 
burden of TB and the quality of the delivery of care which makes the response to the “standard” 
TB case already difficult and might hamper flexible responses to MDR-TB. There seem to be 
different types of uncertainty involved: about the future development of disease and control 
efforts (which correspond to international policy claims) and uncertainty which is more 
characterized by lack of data and knowledge about ongoing activities, thus the present. Literature 
on uncertainty12 differentiates between epistemic uncertainty (due to limited knowledge or by 
complexity) and variability uncertainty (due to variability of system behaviour), whereas limited 
knowledge can result partly from variability. Further differentiation can be done according to 
level and source of uncertainty (Van Asselt & Vos, 2006; van Asselt, 2000; Walker et al., 2003; 
Meijer, 2008). These types of uncertainty seem to exist in the present case as well: uncertainty 
about sustainability of the program, due to lack of data about private sector, different 
performances between states and the unknown burden of TB can be characterized as epistemic 
uncertainty and variability uncertainty can be found in the future development and potential 
impact of MDR-TB on control efforts. The former depends on sources such as lack of 
observations, data or ignorance, the latter originates from the natural system but also human 
behaviour and social, economic and cultural dynamics (acc to Van Asselt & Vos, 2006). What is 
perceived as the source of uncertainty strongly depends on the context (Meijer, 2008), thus it is 
important to understand the context of TB control within which these claims are made. Both 
sources and types of uncertainties are important to understand in order to analyze reactions to it 
(Meijer et al., 2006). According to Walker et al. (2003) situations of high uncertainty call for 
robust strategies which will work in various situations (the strategy that RNTCP chose with 
DOTS) or an adaptive strategy which can be easily modified to fit the encountered situation (the 
strategy that actors who criticize the RNTCP seem to favour). It seems to be useful to conduct 
further research on perceived uncertainties involved in TB control in India given that they can 
play an important role in blocking change by influencing decisions and behaviour of involved 
                                                 
12
 Uncertainty can be defined broadly as “any deviation from the unachievable ideal of completely deterministic 
knowledge of the relevant system” (Walker et al., 2003:5) which relates to a lack of information or to aspects that are 
indeterminable. 
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actors (Meijer et al, 2006). Let us now turn to the discussion about the reactions to MDR-TB in 
greater detail. 
 
3.2 Reacting to MDR-TB: handling uncertainty 
The government is the main actor responsible for public health challenges. How is the Central TB 
Division coping with the uncertainty mentioned above that characterizes the TB challenge in 
India? 
According to Meijer et al. (2006) standard reactions to uncertainties involved in innovation 
decisions can be the delay or abandonment of innovation decisions or the ignorance of 
uncertainty and taking the risk to make false decisions based on imperfect information. 
Furthermore, if uncertainty is acknowledged then often information is collected in order to reduce 
it but gathering information might not always reduce uncertainty. It can enhance uncertainty by 
discovering new uncertainties or harden existing positions because different interpretations are 
possible. Similar developments can be found in the TB case: 
 With regard to the uncertainty created by the “standard” TB epidemic (mainly sustainability & 
quality of delivery) the government is trying to handle it by applying an internationally accepted 
policy strategy (DOTS) and by focusing on implementation of this strategy across the country 
with clear targets as measurements of success (cure and treatment rates). We have seen in the 
preceding chapters that some actors outside the government argue that DOTS is too much 
focused on the biomedical perspective and does not allow enough flexibility or learning to take 
place whereas the government is emphasizing the challenge of operational feasibility and the 
constraints of the public health system in the Indian context. 
With regard to MDR-TB, the government is trying to reduce uncertainty about the burden of drug 
resistance by conducting several Drug Resistance Surveillance surveys to provide a data baseline. 
Simultaneously they are focusing on capacity building and quality assurance of diagnostic 
facilities throughout the country because with existing methods in place it is not possible to 
diagnose MDR-TB. In cooperation with the WHO India office they are fostering the evaluation 
of new diagnostic tests because rapid diagnosis is regarded as a crucial bottleneck. The potential 
threat of MDR-TB also calls for strengthening of existing control efforts, since prevention of 
MDR-TB is expected to be the best strategy to deal with the MDR-TB threat. They are trying to 
strengthen existing control efforts for example by including the private medical and NGO sector 
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to improve service delivery. Furthermore DOTS plus, the treatment strategy for MDR-TB cases 
by the WHO has been adopted and is being tested in a first treatment site. 
This sounds like a flexible reaction more or less in line with the policy claims stated at the outset 
of this paper. However, these reactions are not always straightforward and are debated and 
contested among public health experts in India. In what follows, a closer look at some of the 
underlying challenges in defining burden, diagnosis, prevention and treatment of MDR-TB will 
be undertaken. 
 
3.2.1 Defining the problem of MDR-TB 
As mentioned above MDR-TB is a politically sensitive issue because MDR incidences should go 
down if a DOTS program is working well. According to a private chest physician, there has been 
initial resistance in the government to accept that there is a serious problem due to the implicit 
acknowledgment that things might not work as smoothly as they appear. That the program is 
reacting now to MDR-TB shows to him that there has been a shift in attitude (Interview with 
chest physician, Delhi, 21.2.2008). According to a former senior TB consultant at the World 
Bank there has been a certain feeling of accomplishment when implementation of RNTCP across 
the country was reached which allows now directing more focused attention to emerging issues 
such as MDR-TB (Interview, Delhi, 05.03.2008). 
However, several private physicians complain about the resistance to criticism by the government 
and the lack of willingness to reflect openly about the reasons for increasing MDR-TB cases. One 
of the often cited factors by public health experts outside the government is the definition of the 
category II treatment regime which is, according to them, breeding MDR-TB13. It is felt by 
private physicians that the government doesn’t seem ready to think about why these categories 
have been adopted and whether they ought to be changed (Interview with chest physician, Delhi, 
21.2.2008). Besides the contested treatment of category II patients, they complain that the 
RNTCP does not recognize old patients as retreatment cases since most of the patients present 
themselves as new cases. The continuing problems with adherence to treatment, neglect of socio-
cultural factors and lacking regulation of and cooperation with the private sector are further 
                                                 
13
 Patients under category II (retreatment, failure/relapsed cases) are treated with one additional drug only, in contrast 
to other countries where 2-3 additional new drugs are added which is of course much more costly. In addition these 
patients are not immediately tested for MDR-TB, only if they fail the CatII treatment. Many physicians we talked to 
think that this category is breeding resistance and there is anecdotal evidence confirming these concerns. 
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breeding drug resistance. Thus, arguments have been made that the RNTCP is actually creating 
MDR-TB.  
The government argues that MDR-TB is mainly a problem of non-compliance with treatment by 
the patients and of the private medical sector where inadequate, insufficient or non-standardized 
treatment regimes are common. They argue that treating as many patients as possible under the 
DOTS regime is the best prevention for MDR-TB (Interview with supervising medical officer, 
RNTCP, Government AP, Hyderabad, 21.1.2008). 
Thus, actors tend to blame each other and define the problem differently. It is internationally 
acknowledged that MDR-TB is increasing due to mismanagement and repeated mistreatment of 
TB cases (WHO, 2008). However, the factors responsible for poor treatment in the Indian context 
are understood differently among actors involved. 
 
3.2.2 Diagnosing MDR-TB 
The improvement of diagnostic tests is seen by many researchers as the greatest challenge at the 
moment in TB control. The difficulty is to be able to distinguish between infection and active 
disease and to develop tests that are able to be utilized in the current health system and its levels 
of absorptive capacity. (In endemic settings like India almost the entire population is infected 
with the mycobacterium TB but only around 10% will develop the disease during their lifetime.) 
(Central TB Division, 2007; Interview with senior microbiologist, Tuberculosis Research Center 
(TRC), Chennai, 13.3.2008). 
As of now, there is absolutely no surveillance or diagnostic system for MDR-TB in the Indian 
public health system. Diagnosing MDR-TB however, is not that simple. There are several 
techniques available or in development, but none of them standardized or evaluated for the TB 
program yet and all of them require higher laboratory capacity and bio-safety levels than 
currently in place (Interviews: microbiologist, research foundation, Mumbai, 2.2.2008, TB 
consultant, WHO India office, Delhi, 22.2.2008). 
Opinions differ about the appropriateness of different diagnostic techniques (solid culture, liquid 
culture, molecular tests) depending on turndown time, cost-effectiveness, required laboratory 
capacity, feasibility, etc. Various research initiatives by public, private or NGO laboratories are 
looking into better tests or adopting existing ones for the Indian context. According to several 
public health experts we interviewed there are too many different agencies involved acting 
uncoordinated and producing redundancy. This has been a general critique on the Indian health 
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research system (IAVI, 2007) and the TB case is no exception: there is no long-term road map, 
no coordination between different governing agencies, limited infrastructure, funding and human 
resources, and not enough cooperation with industry. A director of a NGO research centre argues 
that not enough importance has been given to the development of cheap, easy to use technologies 
for the public health system in general, and that there is not enough strategic research initiated by 
the government (Interview Hyderabad, 10.3.2008).  
So far, none of the diagnostic tools meet the expectations. The TB program manager has to be 
very convinced of the feasibility and effectiveness when implementing a new diagnostic 
technique given the huge operational effort involved and that it takes 3-5 years to roll it out in 
India. What if someone comes up with a better solution within four years? It is therefore crucial 
to show the utility and operational feasibility of new solutions for the program and the public 
health purpose (Interview with TB consultant, WHO India office, Delhi, 22.2.2008). 
 
It is furthermore regarded as very challenging to get the new techniques implemented in the 
system. Often lab technicians are not in touch with cutting edge science and technology and are 
more comfortable with what they have been doing for years. The ones who could introduce new 
techniques, the lab supervisors, are often young science graduates (because senior 
microbiologists are not interested in public sector jobs), supervising older, more senior lab 
technicians who are not ready to listen to the ideas of young graduates (Interview with 
microbiologist, research foundation, Mumbai, 2.2.2008). There is a lack of motivation and 
leadership in the system also due to the huge workload on public laboratories which creates 
further barriers to change. The absorptive capacity for new technology and techniques for 
diagnosing MDR-TB is thus an important factor hampering change, strongly connected to 
challenges inherent to the health and wider social system. 
 
Regardless of which diagnostic test will be introduced for MDR-TB they all require a certain 
laboratory capacity. Since MDR-TB is defined as a laboratory diagnosis14 the Central TB 
division argues that one needs to strengthen laboratory capacities first in order to be able to 
                                                 
14
 Microbiologists argue that the diagnosis of MDR-TB is not purely a laboratory diagnosis. The problem with 
bacterial resistance is such that if there is resistance in the lab it doesn’t mean that you would get the same in the 
body reaction. It can happen that the patient seems to respond to the treatment from a clinical point of view but still 
be resistant from a laboratory point of view (Interview with director research centre, Hyderabad, 10.3.2008). 
Following up the patients and correlating lab and clinical diagnosis would therefore be important but is hardly done. 
Thus, it is challenging to define, what you can call MDR-TB.  
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diagnose cases. So far there are only a few quality assured labs that are able to diagnose MDR 
and thus the government is planning to have 24 laboratories (state-level Intermediate Reference 
Laboratories, IRLs) accredited across the country by 2020. But it is a long and difficult process 
given persistent problems in the health system with staffing15; so much so that many experts 
doubt that it will work by 2020 (Interviews: director, research centre, Hyderabad, 10.3.2008; 
public health consultant, international NGO, 24.3.2008).  The staffing of the laboratories 
highlights structural problems inherent to the health system. According to a WHO advisor this 
aspect has been underestimated by many in the government and therefore the MDR-TB challenge 
is far more complicated than expected (Delhi, 22.2.2008). 
.  
The strong focus on quality assurance for culture sensitive laboratories by the government 
(pushed by the WHO as many argue) is contested among public health experts and accused of 
slowing down the reaction unnecessarily since it is hampered by challenges inherent to the health 
system which might take a long time to change (Interviews: public health consultant, 
international NGO, Hyderabad, 24.3.2008; head of a national NGO, Hyderabad, 16.2.2008). 
Although accreditation is essential to bring a uniform standard to all the labs, improve quality of 
diagnosis and allow sharing of data, samples and strains for research, it seems to be a huge 
challenge to talk about quality control if the skills are not even existing in government 
laboratories (Interviews: director research centre, Hyderabad, 10.3.2008; public health consultant, 
international NGO, Hyderabad, 24.3.2008). 
A public health consultant who has been working on implementation of RNTCP since it’s 
beginning argues that fast reactions would be essential in dealing with the MDR threat and that it 
has to be seen how practical MDR diagnosis and treatment can be expanded and then 
simultaneously quality can be improved. The current microscopy diagnosis, on which the 
standard DOTS is based, was started without quality control which was only introduced five 
years later. In the same way states should be allowed to start with diagnosing MDR-TB without 
accreditation and overall quality control. “If you don’t act fast you are further creating a problem, 
if you act fast at least you will learn from your mistakes” (Interview; Hyderabad 24.3.2008). 
 
                                                 
15
 These state level laboratories are complicated to run and the jobs are not financially attractive enough for senior 
microbiologists.  
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Furthermore there are debates about the timing of MDR-TB tests within the standard TB 
treatment regime.  
“…Everyone is treated according to the DOTS regimen, the test for MDR will only take 
place once a person failed the CATII treatment which is already the retreatment stage. 
Then they become suspects for MDR and then it takes another four months to find out 
whether it is actually MDR due to the techniques involved and the time it takes to send the 
samples to the TRC [Tuberculosis Research Centre] and back. So there is a time gap 
involved which is very dangerous for the patients.” (Interview WHO TB-consultant, 
Gujarat, 5.2.2008) 
At the moment, the system doesn’t allow for the finding of primary MDR-TB since culture 
sensitivity tests that are necessary to diagnose MDR-TB are only run after the patient is failing 
standard treatment and the retreatment. With current levels of techniques, skills and capacity, 
testing each and every patient when he/she enters the TB program is simply not feasible. 
Although the time saved (around eight months at least) on treatment would benefit the patient and 
the program.  
The struggles and discussions around diagnosing MDR-TB show that there are many barriers to 
change inherent in current TB control efforts due to constraints by operational feasibility, 
response capacity and challenges in the public health and wider social system which make a 
flexible response difficult. The strong influence of the WHO becomes evident for example in the 
emphasis on quality assurance of laboratories. 
 
3.2.3 Treating MDR-TB 
The treatment of MDR-TB is complicated, long, toxic, frustrating for the patient and cannot 
easily be standardized because it needs a lot of counselling and room for individual care 
(Interview with chest physician, Delhi, 21.2.2008). The government is piloting treatment in 
accordance with the DOTSplus guidelines by WHO16 in a hospital in Ahmedabad.  
Debates revolve around how to best ensure adherence to MDR-TB treatment (Interview public 
health consultant, national NGO, Hyderabad, 16.2.2008), and how to prevent spread of drug 
                                                 
16
 MDR treatment according to the DOTSplus guidelines takes 24 to 27 months and involves injection and drugs 
intake at six days a week (and on Sunday drugs only) in the intensive phase of which some is spent at a hospital. 
Later the patients move to ambulatory phase and tablets only (depending on the weight, above or less 45kg these are 
10 or 13 drugs a day which are more toxic including worse side effects than the standard cocktail of antibiotics in the 
DOTS regimen.) The drug regimen DOTSplus is taken on a daily bases whereas in DOTS it is an intermittent 
regime. One can imagine that the existing problems of compliance are even bigger especially given the fact that most 
of the MDR patients already passed months or even years of unsuccessful TB treatment. 
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resistant strains17. Some public health experts are favouring again the sanatorium approach 
(Interview with chest physician, Delhi, 21.2.2008) but hospitalizing every MDR-TB patient for 
the full treatment time is not feasible from a programmatic and potentially also ethical point of 
view. The pilot site of the government for patients on DOTS plus treatment is treating the patients 
during their first week of treatment and in case they develop adverse drug reactions in a separate 
ward of the TB hospital with natural ventilation providing the infection control. 
The effort that is undertaken at the first treatment site for MDR-TB patients clearly corresponds 
to individualized medical care although the doctors argue that India needs a conform treatment 
scheme and policy for the whole country and individual care would not be an option 
(Ahmedabad, 5.2.2008). Our interviews suggest that there seems to be a trade-off between a 
conform treatment regime and flexibility in treatment and individualized care. According to a 
chest physician the automatic treatment or factory approach without patient interaction will not 
be enough and doesn’t work for the treatment of diseases. There needs to be room to adapt 
treatment regimes to respond adequately to both medical and socio-cultural factors that depend 
on the individual patient (Interview Delhi, 21.2.2008).  
 
The discussion on the treatment of MDR-TB reveals that the central public health debates in TB 
(Walt, 1999; Porter & Ogden, 1999) around biomedical versus socio-political values reflected in 
program design becomes evident in the reactions to MDR-TB as well.  
As mentioned above the TB program in India has been criticized by scholars and some public 
health experts we interviewed for being driven too strongly by biomedical values (Porter & 
Ogden, 1999; Interviews: chest physician, Delhi, 21.2.2008; medical anthropologist, Mumbai 
31.1.2008; senior health activist, Bangalore, 26.3.2008), thus reducing the goal of care for the 
patient to cure as defined by the guidelines and provided in a box full of tablets. Furthermore, as 
the discussions above have shown even from a pure biomedical perspective private medical 
physicians claim that it does not allow enough flexibility to adjust treatment regimes. However, 
individualized and context specific care might not be feasible with the current public health 
systems in place in India and the government argues that the program needs to have strong 
                                                 
17
 A person who is put on DOTS treatment can transmit the disease as long as he/she is sputum positive. The MDR-
TB patient put on a regular DOTS treatment will continue to be sputum positive, maybe less during some time. There 
will be a fall and rise phenomenon in the bacilli load. First maybe 20% of the bacilli will stay infectious, then these 
resistant ones rise to 40%. The initial improvement is then followed by worsening. Then the patient is sputum 
positive again and then she/he is transmitting only resistant organisms because the sensitive ones have died 
(Interview with chest physician, Delhi, 21.2.2008). 
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guidelines in order to keep up quality standards and cope with the weak health system. The 
debate thus remains unsolved and continues for the treatment of MDR-TB. 
 
3.2.4 Preventing MDR-TB 
Prevention of MDR-TB is expected to be the best strategy and many of the public health experts 
we interviewed emphasize the importance of ensuring that patients adhere to the standard TB 
treatment as one of the crucial factors preventing MDR-TB. 
In addition to compliance and diagnostic challenges, poor prescribing practices in the private 
sector where 70% of the patients seek initial treatment are further creating failure cases which are 
breeding drug resistance. Due to the unregulated nature of the private sector there is hardly any 
data on these patients available that often only access public health services at an advanced stage 
of the disease. 
Thus, in the last couple of years the Indian TB policy has been shifting towards more substantial 
inclusion of the private sector and NGOs into the program in order to strengthen existing control 
efforts. The policy implies that private physicians can now refer TB patients to microscopy 
centres and become DOTS providers (Interview: medical officer, RNTCP, Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, 21.1.2008). In this way they keep their patients, can charge for consultations, 
but the patient receives the drugs free of charge. The idea originated in a private hospital in 
Hyderabad, where a well-known and highly respected chest physician was running a pilot project 
on involvement of private practitioners since 1995 funded by DFID and the WHO. Initially the 
government of India opposed the involvement of private practitioners but after the pilot project in 
Hyderabad had attracted interest of the WHO and was followed by many more pilot sites across 
the globe and several operational research studies had shown its importance (among others the 
work of a group of medical anthropologists has been influential in India), WHO Geneva finally 
developed a policy in 2001 for involvement of private practitioners in DOTS and subsequently 
the government of India included it in its RNTCP (Interview chest physician, private hospital, 
Hyderabad, 12.3.2008). 
This is a good example of the initial resistance of the RNTCP against new ideas from the field 
and the strong influence of the WHO. In addition it shows the importance of individual 
entrepreneurs with personal relationships into higher bureaucratic levels. 
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4. Flexibility and innovation in reacting to MDR-TB 
 
The above discussion shows that there is a dominant belief from the government’s side that 
flexibility in reacting to a public health challenge might not be operationally feasible given the 
constraints of the Indian public health context. Experts outside the TB program push for more 
flexibility and criticize what they perceive as resistance to change. This is nicely illustrated by the 
following quotes of eminent figures in TB control in Andhra Pradesh about the role of change 
and innovation within the TB program: 
 
 “…the program is too rigid for any kind of innovation. ..The state officials, program 
managers are so narrow minded, the minute you mention the word innovation, they back 
off! ‘Why innovation? Everything is there in the guidelines!’” (Interview head of 
international NGO India office, 10.3.2008). 
  “…very vertical, very, very telescopic and microscopic in their vision!” (Interview chest 
physician, private hospital, Hyderabad, 12.3.2008) 
 
“The first step of the government is denial, you bombard them with statistics they open up 
a bit, then third stage is they claim you are not showing solutions, then you show the 
solution; then: our country is so big, we don’t want to act fast...” (Interview public health 
consultant, international NGO, Hyderabad, 24.3.2008) 
 
“We have to keep pace with the organism, the system has to change and adopt, the simple 
organism is trying to play with us, we can do.., we have that strength, given opportunity..” 
(Interview public health consultant, international NGO, Hyderabad, 24.3.2008) 
 
Thus the emergence of MDR-TB brings one of the main points of critique of the TB control 
program in India from actors outside the government to the surface: an inherent rigidity and 
resistance towards change and new ideas. The critics argue that there is a lack of flexibility in 
implementation and treatment guidelines, a lack of research for improvement and in general a 
lack of openness in attitude or awareness for adaptation to local contexts, changing circumstances 
or emerging challenges. According to a medical anthropologist most of the emerging problems 
that TB control in India is now facing are actually homemade, based on the lack of flexibility of 
the TB program in dealing with changing environments (Mumbai, 31.1.2008). 
The government officials at the state levels are criticized for narrowly following guidelines, 
focusing on targets and numbers. “…program officers, they are only interested in their numbers: 
how many detected? How many on treatment? How many cured? How many defaults? That’s 
all!” (Interview with chest physician, private hospital, Hyderabad, 12.3.2008). The Central TB 
Division and WHO are accused of being mainly concerned with the figures, cure and detection 
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rates. At the state level there is a lack of adapting the program to local needs and constructive 
communication between state and national level program managers is missing (Interview with 
medical anthropologist, Mumbai, 31.1.2008).  
Several TB experts who wanted to introduce change or new solutions to the TB program 
complain about the resistance they encounter from the government, about introduction of social 
aspects like communication skills, inclusion of civil society and the private medical sector into 
the system or collaborations with the pharmaceutical sector (Interviews: Public health consultant, 
international NGO, 24.3.2008; chest physician, private hospital, Hyderabad, 12.3.2008). It is also 
criticized that the main decision-making power lies with the central TB officer in Delhi and that 
an equal participation of stakeholders is lacking. 
“When I wanted to introduce social aspects into the system -we need to understand social 
factors it is a social problem- they were calling me a fool, the program is about 
Rifampicin18 etc!“ (Interview with public health consultant, international NGO, 
Hyderabad 24.3.2008) 
 
But one also has to acknowledge the perspective of the public health policymaker: Any change in 
the program implies a huge operational effort and implementation needs an enormous amount of 
resources, training and time given the size of the program and the country. As the discussions 
around MDR-TB have shown, implementation of changes is not easy given constraints by the 
health system, lack of absorptive capacities, motivation, stewardship and the widely common 
political rivalry between state and centre government (Interview with microbiologist, research 
foundation, Mumbai, , 2.2.2008). In addition, policy change has to be framed and shaped very 
carefully, because demand is created immediately and withdrawing from a policy change if it 
turns out not to be successful becomes very difficult (Interview with health economist, 
Tuberculosis Research Centre (TRC), Chennai, 14.3.2008).  
 
Clearly, the success and the huge operational endeavour of the RNTCP are recognized by every 
public health specialist and it is not contested that standardization and guidelines are essential. 
But it is argued that the program would need to start doing much more operational research and 
allow constant revision and more flexibility within the broader framework and its 
implementation. It is felt that there is a need to introduce flexibility and learning while 
implementing and to work around the above mentioned challenges and eventually overcome 
                                                 
18
 One of the main drug molecules of the anti-TB drugs. 
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them (Interview with public health consultant, international NGO, Hyderabad, 24.3.2008). 
However, it remains a bit unclear how this could be practically done. It would thus be useful to 
examine in more detail instances of change in the current TB control efforts. 
 
Such experimentation could be in the form of improvements in program implementation such as 
the initial pilot projects on the involvement of the private sector which led successfully to a 
policy shift (as mentioned in chapter 3.2.4).   
Another example comes from a NGO in Hyderabad which developed several so-called “TB 
models” to improve program implementation. They created the concept of sputum collection 
centres to overcome accessibility barriers (in rural areas these are geographical barriers in urban 
areas these are operational barriers as for example opening hours of microscopy centres) and 
improved the transportation of sputum samples by adding another chemical to make the sample 
transportable for a greater length of time (Interview with head of national NGO, Hyderabad, 
16.2.2008). These innovations in implementation have been taken up by the government (again 
supported by personal relations) and are in the process of being implemented.  
Further room for potential novelty is created by the existence of new funding opportunities 
(mainly the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria). One of the most visible 
reactions was the formation of a national TB consortium consisting of the largest Indian NGOs in 
the field of TB trying to become a primary recipient of the donor money19. Currently, there is 
room for change because of shared pressure from WHO and Stop TB partnership and regained 
international attention (Interview with microbiologist, Pune Foundation for Medical Research 
(FMR), Mumbai 2.2.2008). In accordance with these changes MDR-TB offers an opportunity to 
reintroduce flexibility into the control system.  
These instances reflect a broader understanding of innovations for infectious diseases going 
beyond scientific and technological novelty involving more service and delivery aspects. This 
corresponds to an emerging strand of literature on healthcare innovation (Cunningham, 2005; 
Consoli et al., 2006; Den Hertog, Groen & Weehuizen, 2005; Koch & Hauknes, 2005) which has 
provided useful insights into the processes behind innovation in healthcare, albeit focused 
                                                 
19
 But the mechanism of the GFATM is such that the government is controlling the country level mechanism (CCM) 
and thus India’s application for support for TB control by the GFATM. This years’ call is asking for support from the 
civil society but the government is not applying for any financial funds from the GFATM. This is judged by many 
NGOs in the national TB consortium as a very arrogant move (Interview with public health consultant, PATH India, 
Hyderabad, 24.3.2008). There seems to be a lot of political ego and rivalry involved 
 27 
 
entirely on health systems in Europe. It will be helpful to test and further develop these concepts 
in an Indian context in a next step. 
 
With regard to flexibility in responding to changing health challenges the following seems to be 
apparent based on the fieldwork conducted so far: 
The emerging reactions and discussions around MDR-TB that have been examined above: show 
how difficult it is for the TB program to be more flexible in integrating local contexts or reacting 
to changing challenges such as MDR-TB given barriers and constraints of the public health and 
wider social system and the strong protocols inherent in the TB program. 
Thus, the critique on the TB control structure corresponds to international policy claims for 
flexibility in infectious disease control. But it seems that the flexibility is understood in a slightly 
different way: The international policy claims argue for preparation of various different 
capacities in order to be able to react flexible to emerging challenges and be able to innovate 
when it is needed. Whereas this is certainly needed for the TB control mechanisms in India as 
well it is argued that there is a lack of open attitude towards innovation and inputs from different 
actors. Thus, public health experts outside the government argue for flexibility in learning and 
experimenting to improve an existing control structure and for more flexibility within the existing 
program and treatment regime itself. Furthermore, they suggest that one of the reasons for the 
emergence of MDR-TB is actually this lack of flexibility in the existing control structure. It is 
thus not only the flexibility in response to an external challenge that is needed but beyond that 
flexibility in dealing with existing problems in order to avoid emergence of new challenges.  
 
It is believed that concepts such as innovation and flexibility in response to emerging infectious 
diseases have to be analyzed in greater detail in order to understand what they could imply in a 
field level context and to better inform national and international policy claims. They seem to 
contain idealistic assumptions about the normative value of innovation and flexibility in public 
health systems. The case of MDR-TB shows that this might be justified according to actors 
outside the government. But it also shows that the understanding of what innovation and 
flexibility mean can be different. Furthermore, it has to be investigated how exactly rigidities and 
perceived inflexibilities hamper learning and flexibility in response as claimed by some of the 
interviewees. 
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A further exploration of innovation and flexibility both from a theoretical, public policy 
perspective and in further empirical research of specific examples of innovation in TB control 
(some of which have been mentioned above) will thus be useful. These cases of innovation might 
be found in the changes that have been introduced in the TB program since its implementation in 
1995 which somehow managed to overcome initial rigidities and system related constraints.  
Applying an innovation perspective will be helpful to capture these changes in responses to 
emerging challenges theoretically, making use of and further developing literature on healthcare 
innovation (Cunningham, 2005; Consoli et al., 2006; Den Hertog, Groen & Weehuizen, 2005; 
Koch & Hauknes, 2005). Such an analysis will provide further insights into what flexibility and 
innovation can mean for a public health system in a country like India that is confronted with an 
emerging public health challenge such as MDR-TB. Thus, it will ultimately help to explore what 
public policy can do to create and strengthen response capacities for changing public health 
challenges. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It has been claimed that emerging infectious diseases enhance uncertainty and that in order to 
respond adequately flexibility and innovation within public health systems are needed. 
With these claims in mind we have been visiting the case of MDR-TB in India. We found that the 
emergence of MDR-TB is enhancing uncertainty mainly with regard to the potential impact on 
current control efforts and that it adds to the already existing uncertainty (burden of TB and 
sustainability of care) that is prevalent in the control of the standard TB epidemic. It has been 
argued that it would be helpful to further examine which types of uncertainties prevail and how 
they are responded to. In discussing how uncertainty is handled and the reactions to MDR it 
became clear that actors blame each other for the reasons of the emergence of MDR-TB, that 
many barriers to change exist within the TB control structure and the public health system and 
that classic public health debates of TB continue for MDR-TB. 
Further, the emergence of MDR-TB makes clear that the Indian TB program, despite being a 
huge endeavour and having had a certain amount of success, is struggling with challenges 
(inherent to the program and to the health and wider social system) that perpetuate the problem of 
MDR-TB and in the same time hamper the response towards it.  
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We have seen that MDR-TB is meeting an existing control structure that is criticized of being 
rigid in its treatment protocols and they way it is delivered and that is accused of hampering 
flexibility in reactions to new challenges that are emerging.  However, the flexibility that is 
argued for by actors outside the government involves more localized learning and experimenting 
within the existing control structure. 
Thus, the reactions to MDR-TB in India bring inherent challenges, rigidities, debates and 
uncertainties within the current TB control effort to the surface. Flexibility and innovation seem 
to be needed but are difficult to realize partly because they seem not to be operationally feasible. 
Nonetheless, change is happening in reaction to MDR-TB, though in bits and pieces, more in an 
uncoordinated manner and mainly initiated through bottom-up initiatives or pushed by actors 
outside the ministry of health. It is in these examples that one can start thinking about what 
flexibility and innovation for TB control in India could mean in practice in order to better 
understand the possibilities and the usefulness for the Indian public health system to innovate and 
react flexible to emerging challenges such as MDR-TB. 
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